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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY  
SOURCE METHOD EXEMPTION 3828  
NAZI WAR CRIMES DISCLOSURE ACT  
DATE 2008

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AIR

MEMA-36512

74-6-130/3

Chief, SR  
Attn: [ ]  
Chief, Munich Base

18 August 1958

INFO: MB  
COS/O

REDWOOD/LCINPROVE/AEBATH/OPERATIONS

July 1958 Progress Report

CAP

REF: MEMA-34832, 23 July 1958

ACTION REQUIRED: Headquarters approval for the transfer of AEBATH/1 to FBPRIME for reassignment. See paragraphs 2 b and C below.

1. Synopsis of Developments: During the reporting period there were four meetings with AEBATH/1. He continued to submit a stream of reports regarding local Ukrainian emigrés. AEBATH/1 made known his true desires regarding transfer from Germany, namely that he does not wish to be transferred to Paris.

2. Question of AEBATH/1's Status:

a. AEBATH/1 Refuses Transfer to Paris: See MEMA-36155, dated 4 August 1958, regarding AEBATH/1's refusal of transfer from Germany to Paris and MB's recommendations regarding his transfer to Athens.

b. Expiration of Project AEBATH: Project AEBATH expired 31 July 1958, it is therefore requested that Headquarters make provisions for subsequent payments of salary and operational expenses to AEBATH/1 and notify MB, before the end of August 1958, to which account these funds should be charged.

c. Termination of AEBATH/1 at MB:

1) MB has reassessed and reevaluated AEBATH/1's current and potential usefulness as an MB/LCINPROVE asset. The conclusion reached in our reexamination is that his productivity at MB is not and will not be commensurate with the money and time invested. As Headquarters pointed out in HMM-5525, dated 22 January 1958, there were two alternatives which remained in view of the KUFIRE decision, to wit, transfer AEBATH/1 out of Munich or terminate him. MB's recent recommendation that AEBATH/1 be transferred to Athens is found in MEMA-36155. However, if this transfer cannot be effected speedily and securely, it is further recommended that Headquarters suggestion, found in paragraph 2 of HMM-5525, be considered at this time, i.e., "immigration to FBPRIME".

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for a cooling-off period and a later reassignment to whatever area his talents might best be exploited". If Headquarters concurs, and in view of the KUFIRE decision there should be no reason for non-concurrence, it is felt this topic can be introduced in a discreet manner with ABCEPELIN/1 who, after viewing the circumstances, including the security aspects of his continued employment here, probably will go along with the suggestion.

2) It is estimated that ABCEPELIN/1's practical effort and productivity for MB/LCIMPROVE reached its peak about one year ago and, in effect, during the past 12 years ABCEPELIN/1, to all intent and purposes, has exhausted the field of operational reporting on the Ukrainian emigre' scene. In view of this, we intended to turn ABCEPELIN/1's talents from a passive reporting role into a more active general operational role. We discussed this change with him and he began carrying out his new assignments. One example of this was his participation in the [ ]

[ ] case. However, his interest appeared to deteriorate, probably since he felt he would be transferred into more fertile territory (this is discussed at some length in BOMA-36155). MB did not press ABCEPELIN/1 to undertake a more aggressive approach when we learned of KUFIRE's decision to terminate or transfer him from Munich, but permitted him to continue in his reporting role. As evidenced by progress reports since early 1958, ABCEPELIN/1 has continued his stream of reporting. However, from the viewpoint of MB's current interests (i.e., deemphasis of emigre' operations), such reporting has had, and will continue to have, limited value. It must be noted that our aim is not to belittle ABCEPELIN/1's talent but to view him objectively and accurately assess his value to our current and future LCIMPROVE effort.

3) It is therefore recommended that ABCEPELIN/1 be returned to FBPRIME as soon as possible, from which locus his future assignment either to Athens or Paris can then be determined.

### 3. Operational Developments:

a. Konstantin KAPUSTINSKY: During the course of contact between the BANDERA SB (Security Service) and KAPUSTINSKY, the SB reportedly debriefed KAPUSTINSKY regarding his RIS career from which the SB gained an insight into RIS intentions against the BANDERA group. KAPUSTINSKY appealed to the BANDERAITES to help him obtain asylum in the FedRep by certifying that he worked with the Ukrainian underground in the Ukraine. See details in Contact Report #103.

b. Czeslawa MYKITA: MYKITA was granted right of asylum in the FedRep and reportedly she said she will assist another woman in coming from Poland to West Germany. Prior to this, Ivan KASHUBA planned to interrogate MYKITA as a means of convincing the BANDERA group and Hryhorii

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DRABAT, her fiancé, that MYKITA is a hostile agent. See details in Contact Reports #103-105.

c. Hennadiy KOTEROVYCH: ABCEPELIN/1's reporting on his talks with KOTEROVYCH are found in Contact Reports #103 and 105.

d. Trend in Soviet Propaganda Program: In ABCEPELIN/1's report regarding the Mikhailov Committee's open letter to Michael ZEROV aka OREBT (see Contact Report #103), ABCEPELIN/1 risked a prediction that the Soviets have embarked on a different type of propaganda campaign in trying to outdo the Soviet emigré's cultural effort. ABCEPELIN/1 feels the Soviets have caught themselves napping in this field and that there already is an indication how far the Soviets will extend themselves. (It is noted there may be some plausibility in this theory when various items in the debriefings of several MB double agents, ABTILLY and ABMERCURY-2, are considered. They learned from the Soviets that the latter plan to publish some emigré creative literary material.)

e. Ivan MAYSTRENKO: Discussions between MAYSTRENKO and AmComLib regarding his re-engagement as a free lancer apparently provided him with the wherewithal to pay key money for a new apartment. This development appears interesting in light of the fact that MAYSTRENKO shortly before was forced to buy sick animal meat due to lack of funds. (See Contact Report #102.)

4. Attachments: Forwarded as Attachments A-D are Contact Reports Nos. 103 through 106.

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*San filed NEBATH*

Attachments: A - Under Separate Cover  
B thru D HERewith

**Distribution:**

- 3 - SR w/atts B-D Herewith; A - U/S/C
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